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esI. Executive Summary
There is a clear and growing need for the 
capacity to anticipate change to be embedded 
in policy. This is critical not only to be able to 
respond and adapt to new situations before they 
occur, but also to shape the future, building upon 
mutual understanding and common visions to be 
jointly pursued.
For policy responses to address all the 
pressing current global challenges, especially 
when these are seen separately from one another, 
is clearly a demanding task. Institutions face 
greater complexity and difficulty in providing 
solutions in due time. In particular, this is true 
when the policy focus extends beyond the 
challenges that societies face today, seeking to 
anticipate future challenges and transform them 
into opportunities.
This is the rationale for the report “Facing the 
future: time for the EU to meet global challenges” 
based on a study carried out in the course of 
2009 by the Joint Research Centre, Institute for 
Prospective Technological Studies (JRC-IPTS) for 
the Bureau of European Policy Advisors (BEPA) of 
the European Commission.
The aim is to provide a comprehensive 
picture of the main trends ahead and possible 
future disruptive global challenges, and to 
examine how the EU could position itself to 
take an active role in shaping a response to 
them. The work described in this report brings 
a fresh perspective, by linking widely accepted 
quantified trends towards 2025 and beyond with 
experts’ and policy makers’ opinions on the likely 
consequences of these trends and wild cards.
The methodology used combines an extensive 
analytical review of recent future oriented 
studies, followed by a wide online consultation 
of the identified issues, and use of multi-criteria 
quantitative analysis (Robust Portfolio Modelling) 
to prioritise the resulting issues. Key issues were 
then presented and discussed in a workshop with 
selected experts and policy makers. This report 
presents policy messages for the EU with a view 
to enabling a transformation of present and future 
challenges into opportunities and can serve as an 
input for shaping the vision for the EU in 2020, 
proposed by the Commission’s President in his 
political guidelines for the next Commission.
Based on the criteria of urgency, tractability 
and impact, the expert workshop identified three 
challenges with a global scope, but which require 
action at EU level, to be selected. These are:
•	 The	 need	 to	 change	 current	 ways	 in	 which	
essential natural resources are used – due to 
the non-sustainable human over-exploitation 
of natural resources. The most well known 
effects are: climate change; loss of biodiversity; 
increasing demand for food; deepening 
poverty and exclusion due to continued 
exploitation of the natural resources; energy 
and water scarcity leading to competition and 
conflict; mass migration and threats in the 
form of radicalisation and terrorism.
•	 The	need	 to	anticipate	and	adapt	 to	societal	
changes – including political, cultural, 
demographic and economic transformations in 
order for the EU to develop into a knowledge 
society. The main dimensions related to this 
challenge are: economic growth mainly 
depending on increases in productivity; ageing 
societies increasing pressures on pensions, 
social security and healthcare systems; flows 
of migrants from developing to developed 
countries; empowerment of citizens through 
enhanced education; barriers to the social 
acceptance of innovations due to lack of 
understanding of technological possibilities 
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and related consequences; and inability to 
keep up with the speed and complexity of 
socio-economic changes.
•	 The	need	for	more	effective	and	transparent	
governance for the EU and the world – 
with the creation of more transparent and 
accountable forms of governance able 
to anticipate and adapt to the future and 
thus address common challenges, and to 
spread democracy and transparency on the 
global level. Related to this challenge are: 
the fading of borders between nations with 
the problems of (especially neighbouring) 
developing countries increasingly affecting 
the EU; single policy governance approaches 
which can no longer cope with global issues; 
and the lack of balance in representing 
nations in global fora.
Based on the above challenges, the main 
policy issues to be considered at EU level are:
•	 Policy	 alignment	 towards	 sustainability	 –	
including the need to align all relevant policy 
domains to achieve: a reform in the agri-
system; a reduction in the EU's dependency 
on resources; an increase in levels of 
education and social awareness; appropriate 
and effective management of migration flows 
resulting from climate change, the aspiration 
to a better quality of life, and labour market 
needs of especially ageing societies; and a 
change in the policy paradigm based on GDP 
to an updated system which also considers 
ecological flows and stocks.
•	 Social	 diversity	 and	 ICTs	 towards	 citizen	
empowerment – including the need to: build 
new incentives to facilitate and strengthen 
relationships between different social 
systems; develop the necessary means to 
enhance education on the use of ICTs in 
conjunction with other technologies; improve 
the quality of education by, among others, 
fostering competition within and between 
EU national education systems; regulate 
the healthcare system by tapping into new 
technologies to allow equal access for all; 
develop radically new and far more efficient 
forms of social protection; and enhance 
regional specialisation through the formation 
of regional RTDI (Research, Technological 
Development and Innovation) clusters.
•	 Anticipation	of	future	challenges	to	turn	these	
into new opportunities – including the need 
to: embed forward looking techniques in EU 
policy making; foster mutual understanding 
through ongoing and inclusive dialogue both 
within the EU and worldwide to build shared 
values, common visions, actions, and smart 
regulations; enable effective and adaptive 
international organisations to become a 
reality; establish partnerships between 
industry-government-society; clarify at 
global fora the role and status of the EU and 
balance its representation in international 
organisations; and foster (e)participation and 
(e)democracy through the use of web 2.0 
and advanced technologies.
The foresight approach employed in this 
study contributes to policy making by supporting 
a continuous and shared approach to understand 
the present in all its complexity, to look at different 
future possibilities and to shape a joint direction to 
follow, considering different stakeholders' points 
of view. This can be coupled with a periodic 
evaluation of what has or has not been achieved 
to enable policy to correct deviations and to 
continually adapt to and re-shape upcoming new 
situations. It is believed that such an approach, 
linked to other forward-looking techniques 
and tapping into evidence-based research and 
quantitative elements, would be critical to enable 
EU policy making to become more adaptive and 
able to anticipate and address change.
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esIII. Main Report
1. Introduction 
The aim of this report is to highlight the main 
conclusions of the study “Facing the future: time 
for the EU to meet global challenges” carried 
out by JRC-IPTS in 2009 for the Bureau of 
European Policy Advisors (BEPA) of the European 
Commission.
This study is in line with the EC’s political 
agenda for 2010 and beyond. Its objective is to 
provide an overall picture of the main challenges 
and trends ahead, and to examine how the EU 
could position itself to take an active role in 
shaping a response. It complements an earlier 
meta-study of the European Commission named 
“The World in 2025: Rising Asia and Socio-
Ecological Transition”1.
Following an overview of the methodology 
applied, this report explains the criteria used to 
identify three key challenges to be tackled at EU 
level. The multiple dimensions of each challenge 
are then articulated and evidence is brought to 
the forefront. For each challenge, the main issues 
for EU policy making are set out.
The conclusions are then presented in the form 
of policy messages and opportunities for the EU 
with regards to the selected global challenges. In 
general, the report highlights the need for a change 
in attitudes and perspectives, and for building a 
foresight culture within EU policy making.
It should be noted that forward looking 
processes of interacting around individuals’ 
opinions, whether or not based on quantitative 
evidence, should be adaptive. Hence, results 
1 Study carried out by EC DG RTD Directorate L – Science, 
Economy and Society – for BEPA. http://ec.europa.eu/research/
social-sciences/pdf/the-world-in-2025-report_en.pdf.
cannot be expected overnight and the use of 
foresight should not be a one-off exercise. It 
requires an ongoing and inclusive approach 
that can continually adapt to socio-economic 
changes along the way. In doing so, policy 
making can reap the benefits of bringing together 
different stakeholders’ points of view of how 
the world can and should evolve, and develop 
smart policies and regulations that must be 
continuously assessed and modified according to 
new situations and emerging challenges.
2. Methodology 
The work was undertaken by JRC-IPTS, with 
the support of external experts. The approach 
developed and employed in this study comprised 
six main phases.
i) Selection of areas of analysis
Six areas of analysis were identified and 
refined together with BEPA, namely: demography, 
migration and health; economy, trade and 
financial flows; environment, energy, climate 
change and agriculture; research, innovation 
and (e)-education; (e)-governance and (e)-social 
cohesion; defence and security. 
ii) Review and synthesis of forward looking 
reports
A broad ranging and comprehensive scan 
of forward-looking reports looking towards 2025 
and beyond, and with potential relevance to EU 
policy making was conducted by JRC-IPTS. The 
aim was to select around 20-25 forward-looking 
reports in each of the above mentioned six areas. 
The selected reports were, in general, recently 
published, covered more than one of the subsectors 
of an area, had a global scope and were produced 
10
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using a participatory approach. In total, 129 such 
reports were reviewed by JRC-IPTS and external 
experts2 to identify existing and emerging trends as 
well as rare events and related facts, timeframes, 
drivers, weak signals and, in particular, impacts 
on Europe and European policies. Based on the 
reviews, around 400 issues that may shape the 
future were identified, and complemented with 
some issues from the FTA 2008 conference survey3. 
In addition, syntheses of each of the six areas were 
prepared, which can be found at http://foresight.
jrc.ec.europa.eu/bepa.html.
iii) Online stakeholder survey
The objective of the survey was to engage 
a wider community of experts in forward looking 
practice and specific policy fields to identify both the 
most relevant and the most disruptive issues as well 
as to generate additional issues. Around 270 experts 
assessed all issues identified in the above review 
phase. The criteria for assessment were: novelty, 
probability of occurrence by 2025 and relevance 
for EU policy making. The issues assessed through 
the survey and the additional issues provided by the 
survey participants can be found at http://foresight.
jrc.ec.europa.eu/bepa.html.
iv) Multi-criteria analyses
In order to determine the most relevant 
issues, the survey results were analysed in terms 
of the above three criteria. This analysis was 
undertaken using Robust Portfolio Modelling 
(RPM)4, with the support of the research team 
2 Effie Amanatidou, Anette Braun, Ville Brummer and Mika 
Mannermaa supported JRC-IPTS in reviewing four out of 
the six areas.
3 During the International Seville Conference on Future-
Oriented Technology Analysis (FTA) a survey was conducted 
on Big Picture Trends, Drivers and Discontinuities Looking 
Forward to 2025. The particularly novel issues from 
this survey were added to the issues collected from the 
literature review.
4 Könnölä T., Brummer V. and Salo A.: Diversity in 
Foresight: Insights from the Fostering of Innovation Ideas, 
Technological Forecasting and Social Change 74/5 
(2007) 608-626. J. Liesiö, P. Mild and A. Salo: Preference 
Programming for Robust Portfolio Modeling and Project 
Selection, European Journal of Operational Research 181/3 
(2007) 1488-1505. See also, http://www.rpm.tkk.fi/.
of Professor Ahti Salo at the Helsinki University 
of Technology. Three different analyses were 
conducted: (i) mean-oriented RPM analyses5; 
(ii) variance-oriented RPM analyses6; and (iii) 
rare-event oriented RPM analyses7. The analysis 
results provided a quantitative basis for the expert 
workshop discussion and for the identification of 
challenges cutting across different policy areas.
v) Expert workshop
A two-days workshop was organised to group 
these identified challenges into overarching clusters, 
hereafter referred to as global challenges, and to 
examine the policy implications for the EU related 
to these global challenges. In addition to BEPA 
and JRC-IPTS participants, 19 experts from around 
the world and 22 representatives from several 
Directorates General of the European Commission 
took part in the workshop. It is important to 
mention that experts were requested to prepare for 
the workshop by familiarising themselves with the 
results of the previous phases and by developing 
their individual proposals for discussion.
With the emergence of a wide variety of 
challenges related to the future of the world in 
2025, three criteria were used to prioritise and 
select the most important ones to be tackled at 
EU level:
•	 Urgency:	 does	 the	 challenge	 provoke	 a	 likely	
impact that requires urgent actions at EU level?
•	 Tractability:	 can	 solutions	 to	 challenges	 be	
identified and implemented, and does the 
5 Mean-oriented analysis identifies issues that many 
respondents consider respectively (with decreasing weight) 
relevant (highest weight), novel and probable. As relevance 
has the highest weight, issues identified in this analysis 
seem to be more relevant for EU policy making.
6 Variance-oriented analysis identifies issues on which 
respondents’ views differ with regards to respectively (with 
decreasing weight) novelty, relevance and probability. In this 
analysis, issues are identified which respondents could not 
agree upon and therefore seemed interesting to be debated.
7 Rare-event oriented analysis identifies issues that respondents 
consider to be improbable but novel and relevant. The issues 
that come up in this analysis are unlikely to happen but have 
disruptive consequences in case they do happen.
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upon this challenge?
•	 Impact:	 are	 the	 actions	 to	 be	 taken	by	 the	 EU	
expected to have a major global positive impact?
Based on these criteria, three challenges 
with a global scope were selected at the end of 
the expert workshop for further discussion.
vi) Synthesis and compilation of the final report
This final report draws together the results of 
the five previous phases to define and analyse the 
main challenges and their implications for Europe 
and European policies.
3. Main challenges for the EU
A number of global challenges relevant 
for the EU were identified. These challenges 
comprise several interesting issues where the 
EU can consider an active policy role to shape 
a positive global response. By doing so the EU 
would be in a position to ensure that its current 
citizens and the next generations can enjoy the 
benefits of a world with sustainable economic 
growth and improved quality of life for all.
To shape proper policy responses that 
address all the pressing current global challenges, 
especially where these can be disconnected 
from one another, is clearly a demanding task. 
Moreover, the focus should not only be on the 
challenges that societies face today, but also 
to enable the anticipation of possible future 
critical challenges so that they can be effectively 
addressed before they occur, thus transforming 
them into opportunities rather than another 
pressing problem.
With this in mind, both current and possible 
future disruptive challenges which are critical to 
the EU were brought to discussion at the expert 
workshop. The main objectives of this discussion 
were to re-organise the findings of the literature 
review and the analysis of the online survey into 
clear challenges, to prioritise the challenges that 
need to be currently tackled by the EU in order 
to secure a better future for all, and to translate 
them into possible implications for EU policies.
In this way, three challenges with a global 
scope were selected at the end of the expert 
workshop. Their multiple dimensions and an 
assessment of the type of EU actions needed are 
articulated below.
3.1 Challenge 1: Need to change the current 
ways in which essential natural resources 
are used
This challenge centres on the need to change 
the ways in which essential natural resources are 
used globally in order to secure assets for future 
generations and prevent (or avoid) the crossing of 
tipping points (the point at which environmental 
impacts would be irreversible).
This global challenge relates to the human 
over-exploitation of basic natural resources, which 
are essential for societies to function and evolve 
in a sustainable manner. Current conditions 
and patterns of behaviour need to be reflected, 
and policy actions supporting the shift towards 
sustainable ways of living could be fostered and 
strengthened. The long term sustainability is key 
to ensure not only economic growth but also a 
better quality of life for all, current and future 
generations. This depends on the intelligent use, 
conservation and renewal of natural resources 
and ecological systems.
The multiple dimensions of the challenge
All human activities both depend on and have 
an impact on natural resources. Food production, 
for example, is highly dependent on water and 
land, and its processing and distribution dependent 
on energy. All industrial activity starts by extracting 
natural resources and then assembles them in 
different ways to add economic value, while using 
energy and generating waste along the chain. 
12
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The chain ends with the disposal of final goods. 
Even the provision of services impacts on natural 
resources when taking a holistic view along the 
whole life-cycle.
Economic growth has largely relied on the 
overexploitation of essential natural resources 
and hence ultimately caused the disruption 
of natural cycles. Techno-institutional lock-in8 
(i.e. path-dependencies in the use of existing 
resources and capabilities and the respective 
inertia for change in physical infrastructures and 
institutions) may be an important factor which 
compounds and intensifies human impacts on 
nature since it creates barriers to the search for 
sustainable alternatives to existing processes and 
infrastructures as well as to behavioural change. 
The most well known effects are climate change 
and loss of biodiversity.
Climate change and its manifold effects
While some issues are still subject to debate, 
there is a widespread consensus among scientists 
and governments on the causes and main 
impacts of climate change. Today it is quite clear 
that climate change derives mainly from human 
activities leading to anthropogenic greenhouse 
gas emissions (mainly CO2) such as industrial 
development, motorised mobility, extraction of 
natural resources and carbon-intensive industrial 
production. The increase in overall temperature 
has already had widespread effects on: water 
and other natural resources, agriculture and food 
security, ecosystems and biodiversity, human 
health, and migration patterns.
It is widely accepted that while over the 
last century the average global temperature 
increased by 0.74°C, the best estimates for 
additional warming during the current century 
is projected to be from 1.8°C to 4.0°C, with the 
8 Könnölä, T. & Unruh, G.C. (2007). Really Changing the 
Course: The Limitations of Environmental Management 
Systems for Innovation. The journal of Business Strategy 
and the Environment 16( 8), 525 - 537.
 http://lib.tkk.fi/Diss/2006/isbn9512282097/article3.pdf.
concentration of greenhouse gases (mainly CO2) 
rising above 500ppmv9 by 205010,11. At the same 
time, the effect of global warming will be felt 
more strongly from 2025, with an increase in the 
mean temperatures between 0.4°C and 1.1°C. 
The temperature rise could even be significantly 
quicker and higher12.
The impact of climate change is projected to 
include a significant rise in the level of the world’s 
oceans together with the melting of glaciers and 
changes in ocean currents. Low lying coastal areas 
could become completely submerged increasing 
human vulnerability in other areas. Floods and 
droughts could affect millions of people leading 
to significant movements of migrants, refugees 
and internally displaced people13.
Rising temperatures have already started 
to alter the Earth’s climate, with a range of 
consequences, including for: water resources; 
agriculture and food security; ecosystems; and 
human health. Climate change together with the 
unsustainable use of land and water are driving 
land degradation, including soil erosion, nutrient 
depletion, water scarcity, salinity, chemical 
contamination, and the disruption of biological 
cycles. Climate related desertification reduces 
availability of fresh water, fertile soil, forest and 
vegetation. The cumulative effect is to threaten 
biodiversity and food security as well as carbon 
fixation and storage.
The economic costs of climate change are 
a major uncertainty. Conservative estimates14 
predict a range of global GDP reduction of 
9 PPMV = Parts Per Million by Volume.
10 Global Environment Outlook (GEO4) – Environment for 
Development, United Nations Environment Programme 
(UNEP), 2007.
11 Climate Change 2007: Synthesis Report – An Assessment 
of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 2007.
12 Llewellyn, J. (2007) The business of climate change – 
challenges and opportunities. Lehman Brothers.
13 Vital Water Graphics – An Overview of the State of 
the World’s Fresh and Marine Waters. United Nations 
Environment Programme, 2008.
14 Climate Change 2007: Synthesis Report – An Assessment 
of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 2007.
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temperature will not rise by more than 2-3°C, with 
poorer countries affected disproportionately. At 
national levels, climate change will cut revenues 
and raise spending needs, causing deterioration 
of public finances. The cost of extreme weather 
alone could reach 0.5-1% of world GDP per 
annum by the middle of the century. At the same 
time, markets for low-carbon energy products 
are likely to be worth at least €500bn per year by 
2050, and perhaps much more15.
The invisible disaster of water scarcity
Although water is not yet considered a scarce 
resource globally, its distribution and availability 
are very uneven, both geographically and through 
time16. The per capita availability of fresh water is 
declining globally, the impacts of which will be 
felt more intensely between 2025 and 2050. This 
is partly due to climate change and partly due 
to excessive withdrawals and contamination of 
surface and ground water.
According to the World Economic Forum 
(WEF)17, there is a dramatic increase in water 
scarcity in many parts of the world. From 1900 
to 2000, global fresh water withdrawals grew 
nine fold with a fourfold population increase. 
According to the OECD18, 2.8 billion people, 
or 44% of the world’s population, live in areas 
of high water stress and this is expected to rise 
to 3.9 billion by 2030. Around 50 countries are 
currently facing moderate or severe water stress 
and the impact of year-round or seasonal water 
shortages is expected to increase. If present 
trends continue, the livelihoods of one-third of 
the world’s population will be affected by water 
15 STERN REVIEW: The Economics of Climate Change, 2006.
16 Living Planet Report 2008, World Wide Fund for Nature 
(WWF), 2008.
17 World Economic Forum Initiative: Managing Our Future 
Water Needs for Agriculture, Industry, Human Health 
and the Environment – The Bubble is Close to Bursting: 
A Forecast of the Main Economic and Geopolitical Water 
Issues Likely to arise in the World during the Next Two 
Decades. World Economic Forum (WEF), 2009.
18 OECD Environmental Outlook to 2030, Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), 2008.
scarcity by 2025 and two thirds of people in the 
world will be subject to water stress by 2050 
(WEF Initiative).
Water scarcity is closely linked to agriculture. 
Currently, 70% of global fresh water withdrawals 
are used for agriculture (up to 90% in developing 
economies) but inefficiencies in water use are 
high. Traditional irrigation in most water-scarce 
countries consumes only a fraction of the water 
it withdraws (about 50%); the rest is wasted or 
evaporates. The increasing lack of water will also 
affect agricultural land use and 55% of the world’s 
population will be dependent on food imports by 
2030 as a result of insufficient domestic water 
(WEF Initiative).
The IPCC assumes that 150 million 
“environmental refugees” could exist by 2020. 
The human, economic and political implications 
of a mass movement due to water scarcity could 
be extreme.
Water scarcity and the increase of 
contaminated water have profound implications 
for ecosystem health, food production and 
human well-being. Contaminated water remains 
the greatest cause of human sickness and death 
on a global level. Global grain harvests will 
be threatened as will the livelihoods of many 
people. This is on top of the billion or so people 
who do not have access to adequate water supply 
today (WEF Initiative). Although the economic 
effects are profound, the political impacts of 
water scarcity are both gradual and local, and 
government response is hitherto weak and 
fragmented. There is no critical event for national 
governments to react to.
WWF19 describes water scarcity as an 
“invisible event”. The first signs of water stress 
are experienced through the degradation of 
natural ecosystems that depend substantially on 
the availability of fresh water. The second sector 
19 Living Planet Report 2008, World Wide Fund for Nature 
(WWF), 2008.
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that will feel the effects of water stress is the 
agricultural sector. For many species the pace 
of climate change and the resulting reduction 
in water availability is too rapid: with 3°C of 
warming, 20-30% of land and water species 
could face extinction.
The reduction of species and other impacts on 
biodiversity
The reduction in land, freshwater and marine 
biodiversity is more rapid than at any time in 
human history. The great majority of well-studied 
species are declining in geographical distribution, 
abundance or both. Although the decline in the 
area of temperate forest has been reversed, with 
an annual increase of 30.000 km2 between 1990 
and 2005, deforestation in the tropics continued 
at an annual rate of 130.000 km2 during the same 
period. Genetic diversity of agricultural and other 
species is widely considered to be in decline. 
Over the past 35 years alone the Earth’s wildlife 
populations have declined by a third (Living 
Planet Index, WWF).
There is a global decline of marine and 
freshwater fish availability due to overexploitation 
of aquatic systems, as well as to climate change 
and contamination. Eutrophication of inland and 
coastal waters caused by excessive nutrient loads 
from sources such as agricultural fertilizer use 
leads to sporadic major fish kills and threatens 
human health and livelihoods.
Terrestrial and aquatic ecosystems are 
also being altered at an unprecedented rate. 
Humanity’s demand on the biosphere (i.e. 
production and consumption of natural resources 
for food and drink, energy or materials and 
infrastructures, and the disposal of associated 
waste products) has more than doubled over the 
past 45 years as a result of population growth 
and increasing individual consumption, and 
currently exceeds the planet’s regenerative 
capacity by about 30%. If our demands on the 
planet continue at the same rate, by the mid-
2030s we will need the equivalent of two planets 
to maintain our lifestyles20.
Humanity could be in the direction of 
crossing tipping points. For example, WWF’s 
“business as usual” scenario shows that annual 
carbon emissions will more than double by 
2050 under the assumption of rapid global 
economic growth and a shift to a balanced mix 
of energy sources. Moderate United Nations 
estimates show global population growing 
to 9 billion over the same period, while FAO 
projections show increasing consumption of 
food, fibre and forest products. Furthermore, if 
present management schemes persist, fisheries 
are projected to decline by more than 90% by 
2050 (WWF Living Planet Report).
Therefore, changes in biophysical and 
social systems may continue even if the forces 
of change are removed, as evidenced in the 
stratospheric ozone depletion and the loss of 
species. WWF points for example to the possible 
global devastation of bee populations that could 
cause worldwide declines in crops requiring 
pollination.
The rising competition over energy resources
With the current pace of economic 
globalisation and no change in government 
policies, the world primary energy demand is 
expected to grow by 40% between 2007 and 
2030, in which fossil fuels account for 77% 
of the overall increase in energy demand by 
203021. Coal overtook oil in 2003 as the leading 
contributor to global-related CO2 emissions, 
and will consolidate this position through 
to 2030 driven by power generation. Global 
energy-related carbon dioxide emissions are 
projected to increase more than 50% between 
2004 and 2030. In spite of the growing demand 
for coal, oil will remain the most sought-after 
20 Living Planet Report 2008, World Wide Fund for Nature 
(WWF), 2008.
21 World Energy Outlook 2009, International Energy Agency (2009).
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should continue to increase22.
A possible global energy shortage due to an 
increasing demand and consumption will lead to 
a rise in global competition for energy resources 
as well as a greater dependency between nations, 
with the EU dependency on oil imports exceeding 
90% in 203023 and dependency on overall energy 
imports rising to 66,6% by 203024. Hence, energy 
and oil will play a key role in future power 
relations and defence policies.
Increased demand for food
The World Bank estimates that demand 
for food will rise by 50% by 2030 as a result of 
growing world population, rising affluence, and 
the shift to Western dietary preferences25,26. This 
will place more pressure on water for agriculture. 
Within the food sector, the most influential trend 
is that the global food prices are growing in real 
terms. The strongest effect of high food prices 
is that the poorest countries will not be able to 
afford decent food or the minimum to maintain 
its basic needs for survival.
In spite of the steady performance of 
Europe’s agro-food system during the last 
decades, it appears that the European Union 
is now at the beginning of a major disruption 
period in terms of international competitiveness, 
climate change, energy supply, food security and 
societal problems of health and unemployment27. 
Disruption means fast change, resulting in both 
positive and negative impacts. Therefore the main 
22 OECD Environmental Outlook to 2030, OECD (2008).
23 95% according to European Energy and Transport: Trends to 
2030 – Update 2007, European Commission, Directorate-
General for Energy and Transport, 2008; In between 90-95% 
according to World Energy Outlook 2008, OECD, 2008; 
91% according to World Energy Outlook 2009, International 
Energy Agency, OECD, 2009.
24 European Energy and Transport: Trends to 2030 – Update 
2007, European Commission, Directorate-General for 
Energy and Transport, 2008.
25 World Development Report 2008, World Bank, 2007.
26 World Development Indicators 2007, World Bank, 2007.
27 Foresighting Food, Rural and Agri-Futures, European 
Commission, DG Research, 2007.
challenge facing agro-food actors is the speed of 
adaptation and proactive responses to secure a 
European lead in this area.
Poor countries will be affected disproportionately
Climate change, water scarcity and lack 
of food at affordable prices will be important 
factors in the increase of illness and death rates 
in developing countries28, through, for example: 
malnutrition; injury due to extreme weather 
events; diarrhoeal diseases; increased frequency of 
cardio-respiratory and other diseases. Falling farm 
incomes due to decreasing availability of water 
and land will increase poverty and reduce the 
ability of households to invest in a better future, 
forcing them to use up savings just to survive29.
According to the UN30 and UNEP31 the poor 
suffer more from climate change, especially in 
dry lands which support some 2 billion people, 
90% of whom living in developing countries. 
Less developed countries are also suffering more 
the effects of resources scarcity and the forecast is 
that this trend will lead to a deepening in poverty 
and exclusion (unequal access to natural and 
economic resources) linked to an unsustainable 
exploitation of the natural resources still available 
in these countries. This will ultimately lead to 
deterioration in the natural balance for the world 
as a whole.
Furthermore, natural hazards and catastrophes, 
such as droughts and floods, may appear more 
often. They are also likely to have wider impacts 
in developing nations and in weak and failed 
28 IPCC (2007): Climate Change 2007 – Synthesis Report. 
An Assessment of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change; UNEP (2007): Global Environment Outlook – 
The fourth Global Environment Outlook: environment for 
development (GEO-4).
29 UNDP (2007): Human Development Report 2007/2008 – 
Fighting Climate Change: Human Solidarity in a Divided 
World. United Nations Development Programme.
30 Trends in Sustainable Development: Agriculture, Rural 
Development, Land, Desertification and Drought. United 
Nations (UN), 2008.
31 Global Environment Outlook (GEO4) – Environment for 
Development, United Nations Environment Programme 
(UNEP), 2007.
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states, due to their lack of ability to manage crises 
and mitigate the consequences, such as famine, 
pandemics, and riots32. These, together with 
climate change, water scarcity and lack of food at 
affordable prices pose increasing pressures to the 
EU such as mass migration, and threats in the form 
of radicalisation and terrorism.
The way forward
These and other consequences linked to 
human pressures on natural resources are likely 
to increase dramatically in the near future. 
The current environment and financial crisis 
together with the imminent threat of new global 
pandemics (e.g. Influenza A H1NI, “swine flu”) 
has to be seen as an alert for effective actions to 
transform the way in which natural resources are 
used globally and to balance global cooperation 
and competition. However, an effective global 
response to climate change and resource scarcity 
will depend on creating the conditions for 
international collective action.
In this regard, many governments have, 
for example, established and adopted the 2010 
biodiversity target to reduce the rate of loss of 
biodiversity at global, regional and national scales 
(target set out by the Convention on Biological 
Diversity and endorsed by the 2002 World 
Summit on Sustainable Development33). However, 
current policies and economic systems do not 
incorporate the values of biodiversity effectively 
in either the political or the market systems, and 
many policies that are already in place are yet to 
be fully implemented or enforced.
How then should we deal with the need 
to feed the world population taking into 
consideration changes in diet, environmental 
degradation, disruption of energy supplies, 
32 The State of Food Insecurity in the World – High Food 
Prices and Food Security: Threats and Opportunities, 
Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations 
(FAO), 2008; Foresighting Food, Rural and Agri-Futures, 
European Commission, DG Research, 2007.
33 http://www.worldsummit2002.org/index.htm.
new global pandemics, and approaching 
tipping points? Moreover, how can economic 
value be assigned to biodiversity such as 
pollination or water?
As mentioned above, there is a need 
for global agreements on trade, values and 
sustainability to enable a transformation in 
the way in which natural resources are used 
globally so that we can secure assets for future 
generations. This entails both international 
partnerships (i.e. between nations and 
international institutions globally) as well as 
partnerships between governments, industry 
and overall societies. In fact, international 
organisations need to be strengthened to better 
achieve global agreements (cf. challenge 3).
The EU is in a position to drive change by 
example and by fostering the understanding of 
different points of view worldwide with the aim of 
both building common visions based on globally 
accepted values, such as human rights, as well as 
of enabling the definition of common regulations 
and juridical approaches. However, this cannot 
be enforced and is based on dialogue. Critical 
in this respect is the political will to change and 
to become more accountable to citizens (cf. 
challenge 2). Moreover, there is also the need 
to build an institutional adaptive capacity (cf. 
challenge 3) and related dynamic structures to 
deal with change and disruptive elements such as 
pandemics and floods.
The main driver for measuring economic 
growth and wealth, which is reflected in policy 
decisions, should thus change from GDP to 
measures that account also for biodiversity or 
ecological flows and stocks, and thus internalise 
current externalities34. In the same way in which 
34 Other than GDP and GNP, there are currently alternative 
measures of domestic income, such as national income, 
personal income and disposable personal income. Another 
example is the green gross domestic product (green GDP) 
which is an index of economic growth with the environmental 
consequences of that growth factored in (Green GDP 
Accounting Study Report 2004 was issued jointly to the public 
by the State Environmental Protection Administration of China 
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driver from GDP to ecological flows and stocks, 
industry could learn more from nature and 
establish processes which emulate ecological 
cycles. Hence, analogous technical cycles35 can 
be established to give human-made materials 
and precious organic molecules life through 
reuse/recycling, which could also be driven 
by renewable energy, to establish closed-loop 
manufacturing processes36. It is important to 
underline that businesses play a crucial role in 
tackling climate change and resource scarcity, 
as well as in fostering responsible consumption 
to take place. Therefore, global partnerships 
between industry-government-society are critical, 
and governments and international organisations 
can enable the framework conditions and 
juridical power (cf. challenge 3) to ensure that 
the above partnerships are developed and that 
industry plays its role within global societies.
3.2 Challenge 2: Need to anticipate and adapt 
to societal changes
This challenge focuses on the need to adapt 
to and cope with political, cultural, demographic 
and economic transformations to enable the EU 
to fully become a knowledge society.
(SEPA) and the National Bureau of Statistics of China (NBS) 
on Sept. 08, 2006). Also, social indicators covering a broad 
range of components of well-being highlight significant cross-
country correlations with GDP per capita in several cases, but 
insignificant correlations between changes in GDP per capita 
and in various social outcomes (Alternative measures of well-
being, OECD social, employment and migration working 
papers no 33, 2006). A good overview on the Measurement 
of Economic Performance and Social Progress is given by the 
report of the correspondent Commission chaired by Professor 
Joseph E. Stiglitz (2009).
35 Jacobs (2001) defends that business economic sustainability 
goes through the mimicry of common biotic phenomena. 
This is an approach called ‘bio-mimicry’ where scientists 
try to develop productive processes through the observation 
of nature. In this way, companies should learn with the 
processes of nature to adapt and translate them into 
business processes (Cagnin, 2005 – cf. footnote 36).
36 An Information Architecture to Enable Business Sustainability. 
University of Manchester PhD Thesis, Cagnin, 2005; Eco-
innovation: When Sustainability and Competitiveness Shake 
Hands, Hampshire, Palgrave-McMillan, Carrillo-Hermosilla, 
J., del Río, P. & Könnölä, T. 2009.
Business, demography, migration and overall 
societies are generally changing at a much 
higher speed than public institutions and related 
decision making processes. Legal frameworks, 
social security systems, education and the models 
of healthcare have difficulties to keep up with 
the pace of these transformations. This hampers 
innovation and economic growth, and puts high 
pressure on natural resources and on the ability of 
institutions to cope with societal transformations. 
Beyond the consequences already mentioned in 
challenge 1 above, within the EU there are, for 
instance, now increasing concerns on how to 
provide equal access to healthcare and how to 
become a so called knowledge society.
The multiple dimensions of the challenge
The age structure of the EU population is 
projected to change dramatically in the coming 
decades due to the dynamics of fertility, life 
expectancy and migration. Ageing societies will 
have economic consequences: the cost of trying 
to maintain pensions and health coverage will 
squeeze out expenditures on other priorities, 
such as defence and the development of the 
knowledge society. Moreover, the likely change 
in the balance of world economic and political 
power may also constrain the efforts towards the 
knowledge society.
Decline in European working-age population 
affecting economic growth
The European young population (aged 
0-14) is projected to decline gradually from 
2020 onwards. According to EUROPOP2008 
population projections37, the working-age 
population (aged 15-64) will start to decline as 
from 2010 and will drop by 15% over the whole 
projection period (2008-2060). The elderly 
population (aged 65 and above) will increase 
37 EUROPOP2008 (EUROpean POpulation Projections, 
base year 2008) convergence scenario which contains 
statistical information on EU population projections 
(Eurostat). Data comprise the EU27 Member States, 
Norway and Switzerland.
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very markedly throughout the projection period, 
rising from 85 million in 2008 to 151 million in 
2060 in the EU38.
These demographic trends are expected 
to have a major impact on the supply of labour 
in the EU. While there is still high potential for 
increasing employment through increased labour 
force participation, notably of women, immigrants 
and older workers, it can be expected that within 
around one decade, rising employment rates 
will no longer be sufficient to compensate for 
the decline in the working-age population in the 
EU. As a consequence of these trends economic 
growth will mainly depend on increases in 
productivity. This happens in a situation where 
there is a worldwide explosion of information and 
a consequent fragmentation of knowledge, both 
of which are expected to increase significantly 
following the rhythm of globalisation39.
Ageing increasing pressures over EU social 
security, pension and healthcare systems
The number of very old people (aged 80 
years and above) is projected to almost triple 
from 22 million in 2008 to 61 million in 2060, 
which will have a wide-ranging impact on 
economic growth, affecting savings, investment, 
consumption, labour markets, pensions, 
taxation, the need for healthcare services and 
intergenerational relationships40. In a situation 
of deteriorating public finance, the cost of 
pensions and healthcare will be put under 
high pressure. At the same time, increasing 
awareness of opportunities in healthcare raises 
the expectations of citizens, who want the best 
available care at affordable prices. The most 
consensual trends ahead are that equal access 
to healthcare will get stronger support among 
38 European Communities (2008): The 2009 Ageing Report. 
European Economy 7/2008.
39 João Caraça (2008): 2025, A World too different from 
today? High Level Expert Group: The World in 2025. 
Brussels: EU.
40 European Communities (2008): The 2009 Ageing Report. 
European Economy 7/2008.
EU citizens by 2025, and that healthcare costs 
related to the prolongation of human life will 
begin to enter the public debate in the EU.
In this respect, the effect of technological 
innovations can be double-edged. Some new 
technologies may create new treatments that are 
more complex and expensive, and that are only 
affordable by a small part of society. However, 
technologies can also make existing treatment 
cheaper and more efficient, such as by applying 
bioinformatics, robotics, computer assisted 
surgery, self-care and e-health services and by 
focusing more on preventive strategies. Self-care 
and e-health services risk, however, to exclude 
that part of society that lacks the necessary 
skills or means to use ICT, as may be the case 
for aged, low-skilled, disabled or poor citizens, 
reinforcing and extending inequalities in access 
to healthcare.
Population ageing influences family 
composition and living arrangements, housing 
demand, epidemiology, the need for extended 
healthcare services, and, partly, migration trends. 
It places increasing pressure on infrastructures, 
the environment and social cohesion efforts. In 
2005, 27.7% of all households were single person 
households41. A large part of these single person 
households belong to people over the age of 80. 
Due to population ageing, the number of single 
and two-person households can be expected 
to increase considerably. Also about one third 
of people living in single-parent families are at 
risk of poverty, compared to 16% of the entire 
population42. Furthermore, as current national 
social security systems tend to focus mainly on 
cash benefits, the trend towards single households 
puts an additional pressure on public finance.
41 Demography Report 2008: Meeting Social Needs in an 
Ageing Society – Commission staff working document 
SEC(2008) 2911.
42 Demography Report 2008: Meeting Social Needs in an 
Ageing Society – Commission staff working document 
SEC(2008) 2911.
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the EU face the challenge of creating a work 
friendly environment while simultaneously 
offering high quality social protection to combat 
social exclusion. The organisation of this social 
protection varies considerably among the EU 
Member States. This includes among others big 
differences in the way labour market integration 
is addressed in the models, but also in social 
insurance replacement rates, that range from 
100% of lost earnings to below 20%. In addition 
the financing of these models depends on the 
sharing of funding responsibilities and on the 
number of future tax payers, which makes 
inclusion of as many people as possible, including 
retired citizens, on European labour markets a 
very important issue43.
While the EU is ageing rapidly, the number 
of young people willing to migrate to the EU 
continues to increase, particularly in the EU’s 
wider neighbourhood. A major proportion of 
the world’s poor population lives on the EU’s 
doorstep and proximity plays a role in migration 
decisions. Net migration flows to the EU are 
projected to be concentrated in a few destination 
countries44: Italy (12 million cumulated between 
2008 and 2060), Spain (11.6 million), Germany 
(8.2 million) and the UK (7.8 million). Besides 
this trend of continuing flows of migrants from 
developing to developed countries, forced 
migration45 due to environmental hazards such 
as floods, earthquakes and pandemics, and 
due to failed governance and armed conflicts 
in neighbouring states of the old Soviet Union 
states or the Middle East may increase rapidly. 
Migration is increasing the social mix inside the 
EU, which can give rise to mounting tensions 
between different nationalities.
43 European Social Models, Protection and Inclusion, 
Institute for Futures Studies, Palme J., Nelson K., Sjöberg 
O., Minas R., 2009.
44 European Communities (2008): The 2009 Ageing Report. 
European Economy 7/2008.
45 Global Environment Outlook (GEO4) – Environment for 
Development, United Nations Environment Programme 
(UNEP), 2007.
Knowledge society and lifelong learning
The shift to a knowledge society in 
combination with increasing heterogeneity in 
the EU risks creating a dual society, excluding a 
large group of non-ICT competent people. This 
shows an increasing need to invest in human and 
physical capital. On the demand side, the growing 
international nature of trade and business creates 
the need for new skills and competences, often 
combined with conventional industrially relevant 
knowledge. This leads both to the destruction of 
old jobs and the creation of new ones, and requires 
capabilities to unlearn outdated competencies 
and to learn new ones. On the supply side, 
evidence shows46 that education systems are 
currently adapting only slowly to the learning 
society. As a result more and more learning takes 
place in different contexts and locations, with a 
growing emphasis on informal learning, training 
services that link offers to business results, and 
so forth. Along with the internationalisation of 
business, learning markets are becoming more 
global, leading to the need for learning systems 
both to become globally competitive and to be 
able to cope with people from many different 
nationalities and cultural backgrounds.
Cyber infrastructure developments will lead 
to new learning models necessary for lifelong 
learning in the distributed and networked 
learning environment. Lifelong learning, through 
both formal and informal mechanisms, will be 
an essential part of the workforce of a cyber-
infrastructure-enabled society47. Complex systems 
will be developed with linked social, economic, 
and political growth tied to access to “learning by 
doing”. Multi-faceted learning networks will be 
possible due to communication and transportation 
capacity provided by technology. Hence, lifelong 
learning will become the norm and both public 
and private sectors acknowledge the importance 
46 School’s Over – Learning Spaces in Europe in 2020: An 
Imagining Exercise on the Future of Learning. EUR 23532 
EN, JRC-IPTS, 2008.
47 National Science Foundation (2007): Cyberinfrastructure 
Vision for 21st Century Discovery. Arlington, NSF 2007-28.
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of education for economic development48. While 
people are expected to diversify the individual 
knowledge obtained throughout their lives to 
remain competitive49, regions seem to need to 
bring together all necessary interdisciplinary 
capabilities to specialise towards a knowledge-
oriented sector.
In fact, one effect of the knowledge society 
is the global competition and the tendency of 
regions to specialise in one or more specific 
areas of activity in order to increase their global 
competitiveness. The process of specialisation 
towards knowledge-oriented sectors is already 
taking place in many regions. Silicon Valley in 
the US is an archetypical example of a region that 
breeds strong clusters in many high-tech domains. 
Due to clusters, many European regions have 
developed competitive advantages in specialised 
activities such as financial services (London), 
petrochemicals (Antwerp), flowers (Holland), and 
biopharma (the Danish-Swedish border region). 
Successful clusters have also significantly increased 
their global reach – attracting people, technology 
and investments, serving global markets, and 
connecting with other regional clusters that provide 
complementary activities in global value chains50. 
Individual regions may get more specialised in 
specific clusters becoming more different but also 
more connected. Regions that will not specialise 
may be in danger of falling behind.
Research becoming more and more 
multidisciplinary
New converging technologies that emerge 
from multidisciplinary collaboration are expected 
to drastically change all dimensions of life: 
social, economic, political, and personal51. Most 
48 OECD (2006): Think Scenarios – Rethink Education. Paris, 
OECD.
49 UNESCO (2005): Towards Knowledge Societies. Paris, 
UNESCO Publishing.
50 European Communities (2007): Innovation Clusters in 
Europe. DG Enterprise and Industry report.
51 National Intelligence Council (2001): The Global 
Technology Revolution – Bio / Nano / Materials Trends and 
Their Synergies with Information Technology by 2015.
applications that are likely to be widely diffused 
in 2025 will combine different technologies such 
as biotechnology, nanotechnology, materials 
technology and information technology. 
Nanotechnologies, for example, will highly affect 
sectors such as medicine, energy, manufacturing, 
instrumentation, food, water, the environment 
and security. The effect of biotechnology 
has hitherto been highly concentrated in the 
pharmaceutical and agrochemical sectors, leaving 
great possibilities for industrial biotechnology 
unexploited52. The convergence of these new 
(miniaturisation) technologies is leading to 
promising applications.
Moreover, the whole field of life sciences 
could become a very important research area 
for the EU in the coming decades, as there are 
no strong global differences on the specific 
technology level and competitive positions are still 
largely undefined in this field. In addition, social-
environmental factors play an important role in 
this field, and Europe is very open to these factors.
Multidisciplinarity requires a new mode of 
research, taking advantage of the advances in 
information technology. Advanced computing 
and simulation tools, distributed wired and 
wireless observation centres and interdisciplinary 
teams permit research on phenomena that cannot 
be observed by controlled experiment. Apart 
from the need to build a cyber infrastructure 
with global standards, a system of open-source 
innovation and a mix of skills will be needed 
to establish virtual research organisations. In 
the future, Europe could lead these new ways 
of collaborative research. In an alternative 
scenario, the traditional paradigm of research and 
innovation could still predominate in the EU by 
2025, with the new research methods being first 
implemented by another region of the world, e.g. 
an Asian country.
52 Creative system disruption: towards a research strategy 
beyond Lisbon. Key Technologies expert group. European 
Commission - DG RTD Directorate K – Social sciences 
and humanities; Foresight, 2005.
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growing importance to lifelong health and 
health innovation around the globe. Together 
with learning and wellbeing, healthcare may 
be one of the most important markets of the 
world in the 21st century, ruled by the principles 
of personalised, predictable and preventive 
medicine and self-care. Healthcare technologies 
will gain in importance worldwide, however 
with different applications for each country. 
Some applications of this kind, that are likely 
to be diffused on a global scale in 2020, are 
targeted drug therapies and increasingly accurate 
diagnostic and surgical methods using biological 
materials and processes.
Space technology programmes in Europe are 
also receiving more and more political attention in 
recognition of the growing strategic value of space 
technologies. There are a number of potential 
applications in the field of communications, 
earth observation, navigation, space tourism 
(which may become a huge market), solar energy, 
microgravity and lunar extraction. Satellite-based 
location and navigation services are also growing 
rapidly. It is estimated that 2.5 billion people 
will use navigation systems (for example GPS) 
in 202053. Additionally, public interest in space 
is growing among western citizens, after many 
years of scepticism. With consolidation of the 
market, many companies might leave the industry, 
allowing the strongest players to strengthen their 
position in the markets.
Business moving from intensive use of natural 
resources into serving knowledge society
The knowledge-based economy supports 
the transition from the intensive use of natural 
resources to building competitiveness by 
providing solutions to individual needs through 
the generation, circulation and exploitation of 
knowledge.
53 Space 2030 – Exploring the Future of Space Applications, 
OECD (2004).
In the realm of manufacturing, the use of 
biological inputs, energy sources and processes 
is likely to be distributed on a global scale by 
2025, since biotechnology is expected to be 
more widely diffused into other areas than the 
pharmaceutical and agrochemical sectors54. At 
the same time production is likely to be global 
and based on a networked division of labour. 
The move towards a knowledge society includes 
breakthroughs in submicron manufacturing and 
enterprise simulation and modelling. Suppliers 
will increasingly become flexible providers of 
systems integration and solutions rather than 
merely manufacturers of products. Structural 
change towards services in Europe is likely 
to continue over the next decades, albeit at a 
slower speed. Three quarters of jobs in the EU 
are likely to be in services55 by 2020. Growth 
is expected in selected areas of high-tech 
manufacturing, particularly pharmaceuticals, 
and the network industries. Optimization and 
diagnosis programmes will improve and evaluate 
productivity, reducing the costs incurred over the 
total lifecycle of products. Manufacturers will 
aim to deliver solutions directly to the end-user 
cutting out all intermediaries in the process.
Asia might become the world’s most 
important provider of manufacturing goods, 
and by 2025 the centre of global manufacturing 
production could shift to Asia56. If this happens, it 
is possible that the global economic power also 
shifts to the East and China by 2020 with firms 
globally seeking both stability and yield.
However, manufacturing could remain the 
most important driver for Europe’s exports by 
2025. European manufacturing industry could 
continue to play a major global role in a context 
where the crucial assets will be knowledge and 
54 Creative system disruption: towards a research strategy 
beyond Lisbon. Key Technologies expert group. European 
Commission - DG RTD Directorate K – Social sciences 
and humanities; Foresight, 2005.
55 COM(2008) 868 final - New Skills for New Jobs: 
Anticipating and matching labour market and skills needs.
56 TNO (2007): The Future of Manufacturing in Europe.
22
III
. M
ai
n 
R
ep
or
t
skills. By 2025 Europe’s share in the overall 
global manufacturing production and trade could 
be about 20% (much higher than its share in 
population), and manufacturing could contribute 
more than 15% to value added in Europe57. The 
boundaries between services and manufacturing 
activities would have been blurred because of 
ongoing transformations of business activities 
along the value-chain.
Although employment in many new EU 
Member States still relies to a great extent on 
agriculture and manufacturing, there are clear 
signs that this is changing rapidly. By 2020 the 
general shift in Europe away from the primary 
sector (especially agriculture) and traditional 
manufacturing industries towards services and 
the knowledge-intensive economy is likely to 
continue. Strong positive trends are expected58 
in business services (such as IT, insurance or 
consultancy), health care and social work, 
distribution, personal services, hotels and 
catering, and to a lesser extent education. This 
shift is expected to shape new job profiles such 
as Old Age Wellness Manager, Vertical Farmer, 
Nano-Medic, Climate Change Reversal Specialist 
or New Scientists Ethicist59.
Emerging markets will dramatically change the 
global geopolitical and economic map
In relation to globalisation it is expected by 
2025 that the world will comprise many more 
large economic powers. China, India, Japan, 
Korea, Malaysia, Indonesia will take on greater 
significance in the global economy. China is 
commonly supposed to become the major world 
exporter in 2025 and South Asia alone could be 
producing 38% of global wealth by that time, 
compared with 24% now. Such a jump forward 
would put the new Asian economic pole on a 
57 cf. EFMN Foresight Brief No. 137.
58 COM(2008) 868 final - New Skills for New Jobs: 
Anticipating and matching labour market and skills needs.
59 Talwar R. and Hancock T., The shape of jobs to come: 
Possible New Careers Emerging from Advances in Science 
and Technology (2010 - 2030), Fast Future Research.
par with OECD countries which should produce 
about 40% of world output by then60. Asian 
competition will also extend to the far reaches of 
the value added realm.
The development of eastern and southern 
Asia is a trend worth investigating further as it can 
lead to major changes on the global geopolitical 
and economic map. The Asian giants as well 
as other developing states continue to outpace 
most “Western” economies, and their huge 
consumer-driven domestic markets become a 
major focus for global business and technology. 
If this continues there may be a modification in 
the balance of power in the area of research and 
innovation, with knowledge-intensive activities 
increasingly moving towards these regions.
The way forward
Policy-makers could provide the right 
framework for the qualification of knowledgeable 
workers, innovation, creativity and flexibility that 
will be needed to be able to reap the benefits of 
such a profoundly reshaped knowledge-intensive 
environment. Most importantly, the EU should 
become and remain an attractive and competitive 
place to work and live in to attract and retain 
skilled workers and to minimise brain-drain.
Therefore, a harmonised approach to 
manage and welcome highly-skilled migrants to 
the EU is beneficial both for economic and social 
development. Migration of young and skilled 
people to the EU can also ease the pressure on 
the sustainability of public finances. This should 
however take into account the effect on the 
development gap. Immigration can have a positive 
impact on the economy in both the country of 
origin and the EU. Returning migrants can make 
a positive contribution to the economies in their 
home countries, as they will bring back improved 
60 European Ideas Network (2007): The World in 2025 - How 
the European Union will need to respond; cf. National 
Intelligence Council (2008): Global Trends 2025 – A 
Transformed World.
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esskills and, often, savings. At the same time, efforts 
should be undertaken to increase the professional 
qualifications of legally resident migrants and 
their opportunities for social inclusion61.
Innovation in learning systems, focusing 
on learner-centred education, is a key success 
factor for economic growth, social inclusion 
and participation of citizens of every age and 
with different backgrounds and cultures in the 
knowledge society. European policy-making 
should focus on increasing the competition within 
and between national education systems on a 
global scale, and re-explore its content, learning 
models and roles in lifelong learning.
Many legal frameworks are missing, others 
are outdated. An example is the set of digital 
networks being used as a basic element of the 
knowledge society. The full use of these networks 
(e.g. for e-healthcare) requires common policies, 
technical rules and standards. This entails inter 
alia the creation of a safe cyber citizenship, the 
development of network rules and a governance 
system in order to protect private data and to 
maintain and extend the neutrality of the global 
network. Knowledge is increasingly fragmented, 
privatised and commercialised, and has been 
made to some degree exclusive by the adoption 
of intellectual property rights. These rules have 
been built for the industrial society, but need to 
be updated in order to adapt to current needs 
of open source sharing of information, and to 
anticipate to potential future needs62.
In the knowledge society, passive consumers 
can become active producers in the creation of 
new goods, services and relationships, through 
61 Through the EU Social Protection and Social Inclusion 
Process, the European Union coordinates and encourages 
Member State actions to combat poverty and social 
exclusion, and to reform their social protection systems 
on the basis of policy exchanges and mutual learning. As 
such, it underpins the achievement of the Union’s strategic 
goal of sustained economic growth, more and better jobs, 
and greater social cohesion by 2010.
62 Higher Education Looking Forward: An Agenda for Future 
Research. European Science Foundation, 2008.
self-generated personalisation, marginalising the 
division between supply and demand. EU policies 
could create a real innovation environment, 
using the social and cultural diversity of EU 
citizens as a competitive advantage. To this end, 
government strategies need to facilitate and 
strengthen relationships between different social 
systems such as politics, university, industry and 
representatives of civil society.
3.3 Challenge 3: Need for more effective and 
transparent governance for the EU and 
the world
This challenge comprises the need for the 
EU to create more transparent and accountable 
governance structures and processes that can adapt 
to and anticipate the future, and to use this capacity 
to do likewise at global level in order to address 
global and common challenges and to spread 
democracy and transparency all over the world.
In addressing challenges 1 and 2 above, the 
required changes in governance constitute a critical 
success factor. Because of the importance and 
complexity of developing improved governance, 
this is a challenge in itself. A key question is what 
constitutes good governance, and inspiration 
for the current context can be drawn from the 
definition formulated by UNDP63 in 1997:
“Good governance is, among other things, 
participatory, transparent and accountable. It is 
also effective and equitable64. And it promotes 
the rule of law. Good governance ensures that 
political, social and economic priorities are based 
on broad consensus in society and that the 
voices of the poorest and the most vulnerable are 
heard in decision-making over the allocation of 
development resources.”
63 United Nations Development Programme, Governance 
for sustainable human development - A UNDP policy 
document, January 1997 (http://mirror.undp.org/magnet/
policy/chapter1.htm).
64 Equity: All men and women have opportunities to improve 
or maintain their well-being, including not only income, 
but also access to education by everyone, etc.
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Existing governance systems and processes at 
both European and global levels appear to be no 
longer sufficient to tackle current interconnected 
challenges, and may need to move closer towards 
the UNDP definition. The reasons for this are 
explained below.
The multiple dimensions of the challenge
Current governance systems are incapable of
tackling current and future global interconnected 
challenges 
Political authority is held by national 
governments, which find it increasingly difficult to 
deal with transnational problems, as the current 
systems and procedures available to solve them 
are usually national. The speed and scale at which 
decision making is needed goes far beyond the 
capacity of existing national systems65. At the same 
time fragmentation and decomposition of national 
states can be expected to continue and accelerate66. 
With regards to international agreements, the 
European Union has been at the forefront in 
combating climate change and has played a 
key role in the development of the two major 
treaties addressing this issue (the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change and its 
Kyoto Protocol67). However, such agreements are 
often organised around single issues, and do not 
acknowledge the interdependencies of global issues. 
Global negotiations on climate change cannot be 
separated from innovation, poverty and exclusion, 
the economic downturn and international trade. 
Copenhagen attempted to revise the Kyoto Protocol, 
and to set up a new legal arrangement addressing 
four themes (mitigation, adaptation, technology 
transfer and financing), thus widening the scope of 
the former agreements. Although some elements 
of these themes are included in the Copenhagen 
Accord, it is not a legally binding global climate 
treaty that can succeed the Kyoto Protocol. In 
general, current systems of transnational and 
65 Florini A, The Coming Democracy, 2005.
66 Theys, Le monde en 2025: les 4 transitions, 2008.
67 http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/items/2830.php.
global governance are still based on diplomatic 
bilateral and multilateral approaches. Without 
a constitutional basis or a mechanism to ensure 
coherence, small advances by each partner in the 
agreement could result in a big loss for sustainable, 
effective global governance68.
The challenges of developing countries 
increasingly become EU challenges
Progress in achieving the Millennium 
Development Goals to halve extreme poverty 
between 1990 and 2015 faces multiple threats69. 
Rapidly rising food prices have increased the 
proportion of people going hungry in developing 
countries to 17% in 2008, making the target 
of 10% in 2015 far from realistic. In 2009 it is 
estimated that the number of people living in 
extreme poverty (less than €0.90 a day70) will 
have increased by between 55 and 90 million, 
compared to before the economic crisis.
Rapidly growing populations create 
additional barriers to achieving the development 
goals in many low-income nations. Urban areas 
of developing countries will account for nearly all 
the population growth predicted over the next 50 
years71. The majority of people will live in large 
conurbations, with profound consequences for 
policy-makers in addressing poverty, crime and 
community relations and a limited state ability to 
reform healthcare, infrastructure and economics. 
Many developing countries also face brain 
drain, low science-innovation links and an ever-
widening technological gap with OECD countries 
due to chronic underinvestment in R&D over the 
last two decades. This further undermines their 
capacity to become self sustainable, and increases 
68 Enrique Rueda-Sabater, Vijaya Ramachandran, and 
Robin Kraft. 2009. “A Fresh Look at Global Governance: 
Exploring Objective Criteria for Representation.” CGD 
Working Paper 160. Washington, D.C.: Center for Global 
Development (http://www.cgdev.org/content/publications/
detail/1421065/).
69 The Millennium Development Goals Report 2009, United 
Nations.
70 The report states $1.25 a day (calculation with average 
exchange rate 2009; ECB).
71 World Development Report 2009, World Bank, 2008.
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esthe risks of creating more new failed states and of 
armed conflicts and terrorism in the future.
Furthermore, the misuse of natural resources 
is likely to have a disproportionate effect on many 
developing countries. If large scale migrations 
resulting from climate change and water scarcity 
indeed take place, the need for humanitarian 
assistance will rise to an unprecedented level, and 
international law would need to recognise this 
type of refugees. The new EU Agency on asylum, 
which should come on stream in 2010, could also 
deal with this kind of issues, including protracted 
refugee conditions resulting from natural disasters72. 
However, natural disasters and failed states usually 
create internally displaced people73 who do not cross 
any international border. If current trends continue, 
these countries will continue to lack the means to 
address the consequences, let alone their causes. The 
limited ability of developing countries to fight climate 
change and to develop a more sustainable future also 
limits the capacity of the world as a whole to do so.
Increasing natural catastrophes and a rising 
number of failed states are also potential sources 
of pandemics. The World Bank estimated that 
combating avian flu in poor countries would 
cost more than €0.95 billion74. The effects of 
pandemics like AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria and 
cholera on the African continent will also have a 
considerable impact on economic growth in that 
continent and in the world as a whole.
As regards trade, the current international 
trading system is unbalanced against the 
interest of developing countries75. This can 
72 COM(2009) 66 final: Proposal for a Regulation of the 
European Parliament and of the Council: establishing a 
European Asylum Support Office.
73 Some 26 million internally displaced persons around the 
world at the end of 2008, 2008 Global Trends: Refugees, 
Asylum-seekers, Returnees, Internally Displaced and 
Stateless Persons– UNHCR, June 2009.
74 Avian and Human Influenza: Financing Needs and 
Gaps. World Bank, 2005. The report states $1.2 billion 
(calculation with average exchange rate 2005; ECB).
75  Meeting Global Challenges, International Cooperation 
in the National Interest, Report of the International Task 
Force on Global Public Goods, 2006.
result in loss of income opportunities for both 
developed and developing countries, if the 
system is allowed to deteriorate and eventually 
proves incapable of preventing countries from 
turning back to protectionism.
It appears that the challenges developing 
countries are facing will increasingly affect the 
whole world, including the developed regions. 
This means borders between European internal 
and external governance start to fade, as many 
problems with consequences on the EU will 
have to be addressed globally. These common 
challenges cannot be addressed without a 
global co-operation that goes beyond offering 
development aid.
Governance increasingly shifts towards 
empowerment, e-participation and e-governance
Mainly thanks to ICT related innovations 
there is an increasing shift towards 
empowerment in governance. The use of internet 
is now moving towards the use of Web 2.0, with 
applications such as social networking, blogs, 
wikis, tagging, etc and this supports a move 
towards e-governance systems. The private 
sector has already discovered the wide set of 
benefits this technology brings to business. A 
recent McKinsey Quarterly survey shows that 
69% of businesses worldwide report measurable 
benefits of internal and external use of Web 2.0, 
and that companies will continue to invest in 
this technology despite the current recession76. 
Governments and public service agencies have 
also started to use these tools. However, the 
benefits for governments are different, ranging 
from services that are more personalised, faster, 
easier to use, to those enabling more effective 
social networking, citizen engagement and 
collaboration with the community. Overall, these 
technologies increasingly allow people to get 
76 McKinsey Global Survey Results: How Companies are 
benefiting from Web 2.0, McKinsey & Company, June 2009.
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what they need from each other, thus changing 
the rules of the game for governments77.
The possibilities of the next generation of 
web technology, Web 3.0, will allow for wide-
scale ubiquitous seamless networks, networked 
and distributed computing, open semantic web, 
artificial intelligence, etc. This is expected to 
create intelligent mass-collaboration networks 
and platforms bringing together all kinds of 
actors. This will facilitate bottom-up, user driven 
and massive social collaboration, which in turn is 
likely to influence and steer policy formation and 
e-governance decisions78.
These developments are expected to impact 
on transparency, accountability, new forms 
of law enforcement, privacy, the rise of new 
countervailing powers and the development 
of a networked and intelligent government79. 
Increased transparency will increasingly offer 
possibilities to citizens to exert effective control 
over their governments, and may also transform 
government culture, towards opening up their 
traditionally quite closed and hierarchical 
organisational cultures. ICTs may force 
governments to continuously account for their 
policy and decision making, while also providing 
them with effective tools to fight corruption. As 
a result, both private organisations and citizens 
could be increasingly involved in law enforcement 
tasks through e-participation.
These transformations will also include 
challenges related to accessibility for all, 
protection of privacy, the creation of a safe cyber 
citizenship, etc. It can allow the development of 
strategies and techniques for better organisation 
within networks without government intervention. 
This can lead to a form of ‘non-representational 
77 Web 2.0 and the Next Generation of Public Service, 
Accenture, 2009.
78 eChallenges e-2008 Workshop on ICT for Governance 
and Policy Modelling, Stockholm, 23 October 2008.
79 Frissen V. et al., The Future of eGovernment - An 
exploration of ICT-driven models of eGovernment for the 
EU in 2020, JRC-IPTS, 2007.
democracy’, where the democratic processes 
are decoupled from governmentality and from 
the constraints of market and state interests80. 
Governments will use more co-regulation, where 
citizens and corporates are increasingly involved 
in the development of new regulations, thus 
broadening the knowledge/experience base for 
increasingly complex decision making, improving 
the transparency and predictability of government 
activity and significantly reducing their 
information costs81. These changes are expected 
to not only lead to governmental transformation 
within the EU and its Member States, but also to 
impact on how governance will be shaped in other 
regions of the world, and at global level. Some 
see a major possibility for the Chinese people to 
successfully “leapfrog” into a new political future 
by incorporating current technologies, allowing 
them to better approximate true democracy82. 
Future forms of global governance may thus 
depend more on citizens’ participation, in order 
to better guarantee that decisions taken are rightly 
understood, accepted and implemented taking 
into account transparency and accountability.
Finance and trade become more global and less 
European
Emerging markets, such as Asia, Latin 
America, Russia, Eastern Europe and Africa have 
been rapidly developing their financial assets in 
recent years (about €19 trillion in 2006)83. New 
power brokers, especially petrodollar investors 
and Asian central banks play an increasingly 
important role in the world’s financial markets and 
their activities represent a structural shift in global 
capital markets. Also hedge funds and private 
equity have become new power brokers, but 
80 Internet governance: towards a non-representational 
democracy, Knahl and Cox, 2008.
81 Germany 2020, new challenges for a land on expedition, 
Deutsche Bank, 2007.
82 India, China and Future of Democracy, Murata T. in 
Democracy and Futures, Mannermaa M., Dator J. & 
Tiihonen P. eds., 2006; Amanatidou E., EFMN Brief 133 - 
The Role of the EU in the World, Amanatidou E., 2008.
83 McKinsey Global Institute: Mapping Global Capital 
Markets, McKinsey & Company, 2008; (calculation with 
average exchange rate 2006; ECB).
27
Fa
ci
ng
 t
he
 f
ut
ur
e:
 t
im
e 
fo
r 
th
e 
EU
 t
o 
m
ee
t 
gl
ob
al
 c
ha
lle
ng
estheir future role is less clear. New power brokers’ 
total assets grew rapidly since 2000 and stalled 
in 2008 to over €8 trillion84. They are expected 
to remain a significant force in global capital 
markets, which poses a wide set of risks related 
to asset price inflation, non-economic motives 
of state investors, systemic risk from hedge funds 
that may lead to create contagion across unrelated 
asset classes or trigger the failure of banks that 
lend to them and credit risk from private equity. 
The ongoing financial crisis has shown that 
such systemic risks can have contagious effects. 
Future similar events are to be expected if no 
better regulatory and supervisory framework at 
global level is put in place. On the other hand, 
such framework risks to overregulate and to stifle 
innovation, if it is not well balanced85.
Shifts in power are also to be expected in 
the area of research and innovation. Estimations 
on the future evolution of R&D are very scarce. 
In 2004, World Gross domestic Expenditure 
on R&D (GERD) was expected to double over 
the next 20 years, rising from €629 to €1,320 
billion (on a constant euro basis). The percentage 
claimed by the US would decrease down slightly 
from 36.6% to 33.0%, while EU-15 would see 
its share fall from 22.3% to 17.5%. China would 
rise to 14.9% and industrial Asia to 24.1% (Japan, 
Korea, Taiwan, Indonesia, Thailand, Singapore 
and Malaysia)86. 
While the volume of global trade should 
double over the period 2008-2025 (despite 
a temporary deceleration during the 2009 
recession, and if no major disaster occurs 
outside the economic sphere, such as massive 
terrorist attacks requiring tighter border security 
84 McKinsey Global Institute: The New Power Brokers, 
McKinsey & Company, 2007; The new power brokers: 
How oil, Asia, hedge funds, and private equity are faring 
in the financial crisis, 2009. (calculation with average 
exchange rate 2008; ECB).
85 High level BEPA conference on global governance, world 
prosperity and development, European Commission, 
Bruxelles, 12-13 May 2009, Draft proceedings (http://
www.forum.eastonline.it/files/GLOBAL_FINANCE.pdf).
86 ANRT, Opération FutuRIS, 2004.
procedures), the European dependence on oil 
imports is likely to increase further and exceed 
90% in 203087, while North Sea oil reserves will 
be exhausted if production continues at its present 
rate. Securing reliable and uninterrupted access to 
raw materials will also be increasingly important 
to EU competitiveness and thus critical to be 
considered by European policy makers. By 2050, 
the EU will be highly dependent on imports of 
“high-tech” metals such as cobalt, platinum, rare 
earths, and titanium88, while China’s raw material 
demand will be growing rapidly with enormous 
environmental and economic consequences89.
The way in which global players will develop 
their relative power depends on the scenario for 
the future. Due to the economic crises, signs of 
a possible rise of protectionism become stronger. 
A deepening of the long term effects of the 
current financial crisis could lead into a world 
characterised by division, conflict, currency 
controls and a further stagnation of global markets 
by 2020, and a global economic shock and 
monetary disruption after 2020. This would lead 
global service providers to hold capital locally 
thus creating local exchange trading systems and 
increasing the global financial instability. Such 
disruptive events could either lead to renewed 
incentives for international financial cooperation 
and risk management or to rapid shifts in the 
global geo-economic powers that could further 
stall globalisation.
The shape global governance will take depends 
on how global players will develop
How global players will face global 
challenges in the future will depend on the 
scenario envisaged for their development. Three 
possible types of scenarios can be distinguished: 
an optimistic, pessimistic and moderate one. In 
an optimistic scenario the EU continues to have 
87 See footnote 23.
88 COM(2008) 699: The raw materials initiative – Meeting 
our critical needs for growth and jobs in Europe.
89 COMMON WEALTH: Economics for a Crowded Planet, 
Jeffrey Sachs, 2008.
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an important role in the world in facing global 
challenges and continues its integration and 
enlargement to actively promote development 
and stability in its neighbourhood. China will 
increase its geopolitical integration with a 
major role in the exchange of goods, services, 
investments and ideas provided that it succeeds 
in executing financial, legal and administrative 
reforms and improving individual rights and civil 
liberties90. India will also increase and establish 
its role in the world if it can set and achieve long-
term development goals and effectively manage 
its ambitions to become a global power with 
sensitive handling of regional dynamics91. In 
similar lines, Russia can increasingly become a 
growth engine for the Eurasia and Central Asia 
region in case of gradual but eventually wide 
reaching governance and market reforms92. On 
the international scale Russia is seen to strengthen 
its ties with the EU and to some extent with the 
US, while its relationship with China is good in 
the context of the supply of energy. The GCC93 
countries see themselves as innovation hubs by 
2025, and enjoy regional stability which provides 
the opportunity to focus on enhancing their 
human capital at all levels and investing heavily 
in education while proceeding carefully with 
political and institutional reforms to support their 
growing economies and societies94. However, 
all these ‘optimistic’ scenarios for 2025 also 
presuppose global growth peaking in 2008 with 
a real GDP growth rate of around 4%. Currently, 
this is certainly not the case with the global 
recession that has spread in all developed states 
and affected, among others, oil and gas prices 
and consequent demand.
The possibility of an ongoing recession is 
defining the ‘pessimistic’ scenarios for the global 
players. Anticipated to occur around 2010-2014 
90 China and the World: Scenarios to 2025, WEF, 2006.
91 India and the World: Scenarios to 2025, WEF, 2005.
92 Russia and the World: Scenarios to 2025, WEF, 2006
93 Gulf Co-operation Council Countries: Bahrain, Kuwait, 
Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.
94 The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries and the 
World: Scenarios to 2025, WEF, 2006.
and built on different reasons such as a lack of 
trust undermining international cooperation and 
trade integration, it is associated with increasing 
international isolation and protectionism. 
Governments in Europe and North America, 
suffering from growing economic demands 
and domestic pressures are seen to adopt a 
protectionist behaviour blocking attempts by 
Chinese corporations to invest and trade95. 
Economic demands and domestic pressures lead 
the US, and the rest of the developed world, to 
withdraw from international engagements in 
India96. In the GCC countries the recession is 
associated with geo-political shocks in the Gulf 
region and falling demand for oil, which prevents 
them from identifying opportunities for enhancing 
the prosperity of their populations97. Russia’s 
‘pessimistic’ scenario is also associated with poor 
levels of investment in infrastructure, neglected 
institutional reforms, capital flight, increased 
corruption, ineffective leadership and a decline 
in the competitiveness of domestic industries. 
Russia’s external relations are seen to deteriorate 
as Russia unsuccessfully attempts to recreate an 
imperialist state, further alienating its neighbours, 
and eventually turns inwards, becoming more 
and more isolated98. In similar lines with the rest 
of the global powers, the pessimistic scenario for 
the EU refers to an increasingly inward-looking 
EU characterised by a European shield against the 
winds of global change99. This is mainly driven by 
fears and concerns about the emerging power 
of the new actors in the world scene and taking 
protectionist measures to stop their growth. In 
this sense Europe turns to define itself by the 
degree to which it is closed to flows of products 
and capital from the rest of the world rather than 
by its stance on the global rules governing these 
flows100. If global recession is combined with 
95 China and the World: Scenarios to 2025, WEF, 2006.
96 India and the World: Scenarios to 2025, WEF, 2005.
97 The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries and the 
World: Scenarios to 2025, WEF, 2006.
98 Russia and the World: Scenarios to 2025, WEF, 2006.
99 Fragmented Power: Europe and the global economy, 
Bruegel think tank, Sapir A. ed., 2007.
100 Fragmented Power: Europe and the global economy, 
Bruegel think tank, Sapir A. ed., 2007.
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esa range of other events, including inter-state 
conflict, domestic unrest and natural disasters, the 
world might eventually realise that meaningful 
collaboration is the only way forward.
Should the global crises be effectively 
handled before such trends and impacts become 
dominant, then the ‘moderate’ scenarios of 
development include increasing collaboration to 
coordinate diplomatic and economic policies for 
the GCC countries101, and continued development 
but gradual decrease of China’s international 
competitiveness102 and unsustainable economic 
development for India103 due to failure in both 
countries to implement the necessary reforms for 
sustainable development. Russia will continue to 
leverage its natural resources, to the detriment 
of the full development of other sectors and is 
seen as a stable and reliable oil provider on the 
international scene104.
The way forward
Different global players will offer different 
governance models
There are diverse views on the role that the EU 
can play as a model in global governance. Some 
argue that the US is likely to keep a leading role 
in global governance, thanks to its strong position 
in the Atlantic hemisphere and its deep ties to the 
Asian hemisphere105. Other factors impacting its 
leading role are the horizontal social structure, 
the culture of entrepreneurship and innovation 
and the emergence of a new generation of ‘First 
Globals’ that forge connections around the 
world106.
101 The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries and the 
World: Scenarios to 2025, WEF, 2006.
102 China and the World: Scenarios to 2025, WEF, 2006.
103 India and the World: Scenarios to 2025, WEF, 2005.
104 Russia and the World: Scenarios to 2025, WEF, 2006.
105 America’s Edge – Power in the Networked Century, 
Anne-Marie Slaughter, 2009.
106 America’s Hedge, Power in the networked century, 
Slaughter in Foreign Affairs, 2009; The Future of 
American Power - How America Can Survive the Rise 
of the Rest, Zakaria in Foreign Affairs, 2008.
The future role of the EU in global 
governance is strongly connected to its ability 
to speak with one voice in global fora. Literature 
suggests that barriers for the EU to do so are: the 
degree of national (or shared) competence in an 
area; the strictness of an international institution’s 
rules of participation; the weakness of the EU’s 
coordination mechanisms; the heterogeneity of 
Member States’ preferences; and the weakness of 
the collective identity107. The potentially increasing 
role of the EU in the world is also associated with 
the course that EU integration and enlargement 
takes. Some see that the agenda of the EU is now 
swiftly changing from building institutions and 
shaping enlargement to using these institutions 
to cope with global challenges. As a variation 
to this scenario, continued enlargement will 
coexist with the focus on global challenges and 
EU integration. In an alternative scenario Europe 
is seen as an ‘open gravitation area’ with varied 
membership. EMU108 has continued to grow but 
the EU itself has entered a path of consolidation 
regarding integration. A convincing concept 
below the level of full EU membership links the 
countries on the fringes of Europe economically 
and politically to the EU. Those Member States 
wanting closer integration have taken advantage 
of the scope to deepen their cooperation. Finally 
the future role of the EU in global governance will 
also depend on the extent to which it continues 
to serve as a laboratory for solutions to global 
challenges, and succeeds in offering blueprints 
for global solutions that have been tested at EU 
level, such as the blueprint that was prepared for 
the Copenhagen deal109 and the proposal of the 
High Level Group on Financial Supervision in 
the EU110 for a better regulatory and supervisory 
framework both at EU level and at global level.
107 Bruges Regional Integration & Global Governance 
Papers - ‘Patchwork Power’ Europe? The EU’s 
Representation in International Institutions, Sieglinde 
Gstöhl, United Nations University and College of 
Europe, 2008.
108 Economic and Monetary Union.
109 COM(2009) 475/3: Stepping up international climate 
finance: A European blueprint for the Copenhagen deal.
110 Report of The High-Level Group on Financial 
Supervision in the EU, chaired by Jacques de Larosière, 
Brussels, 25 February 2009.
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The growing strength of the emerging markets 
increases pressure to integrate them more closely 
into international coordination processes, such 
as the UN, WTO and IMF111. On the other hand, 
Europe as a whole is overrepresented in global 
economic institutions112. However, many rising 
superpowers such as Russia, China, the Middle-
East and some Latin American countries have 
differing traditions in democratic governance, 
which may cause pressures to democracy 
elsewhere. Western norms and values as the 
foundation of the global system could also be 
challenged by radical religious identity politics 
that could emerge as a powerful counter ideology 
with widespread appeal.
In this context of differing democratic 
traditions, the EU may also have an increasing 
role in the world, based on the argument that 
EU’s institutional architecture can be a model for 
new forms of governance for many developing 
states113. Some consider the European model, 
which relies heavily on so-called ‘soft power’, to 
be especially influential in the developing ‘BRIC’ 
countries, offering a model of capitalism that 
delivers prosperity, security and greater levels of 
equality to its citizens, in contrast to the US model 
where the winner takes it all114. The EU model also 
allows tiny nations to leverage their influence, and 
to choose between joining the union or starting 
a regional association to overcome a ‘unipolar’ 
world115. Others argue that many developing 
states in need of improved governance structures 
will find a better match in the well established 
Indian model, because of its long tradition of 
liberal representative government and the many 
similarities with emerging democracies in Africa, 
Central Asia, South Asia, the Middle East, and 
111 Germany 2020, new challenges for a land on 
expedition, Deutsche Bank, 2007.
112 Fragmented Power: Europe and the global economy, 
Bruegel think tank, Sapir A. ed., 2007.
113 EFMN Brief 133 - The Role of the EU in the World, 
Amanatidou E., 2008.
114 M. Leonard, Why Europe Will Run The 21st Century, 2005.
115 M. Leonard, Why Europe Will Run The 21st Century, 2005.
Indonesia and the Philippines116. Zakaria117 argues 
that the US are creating the first universal nation, 
while European societies seem not to be able to 
take in and assimilate people from unfamiliar 
cultures, especially from rural and Islamic 
regions. The combination of this soft power with 
its hard power is seen as a unique advantage of 
the US to play a crucial role in world affairs.
4. Conclusions
The central objective of this report is to 
contribute both to the way in which the EU can 
look ahead, and also how it could, in a proactive 
way, shape a better future for all its citizens, and 
the world in general. Identifying and examining 
emerging challenges, their main elements, and 
their often complex interactions are key steps to 
achieve this.
The work described in this report brings 
a perspective on the most pressing global 
challenges, linking widely accepted quantified 
trends towards 2025 and beyond with experts’ 
and policy makers’ opinions on the likely 
consequences of these trends and emerging 
wild cards. The methodology used combines 
desk research and a range of participatory and 
quantitative methods as previously described, 
and represents an important direction for the 
future development and application of foresight 
methodologies, particularly their role in the 
decision making process. In so doing, it identifies 
possible actions for EU policy making to change 
the way in which the EU could be affected by 
these challenges. It also highlights that these 
actions can be considered at both the global and 
EU levels. Actions taken at EU level could serve 
as an example of how global governance could 
be developed and evolve in the near future.
116 EFMN Brief 133 - The Role of the EU in the World, 
Amanatidou E., 2008; India, China and Future of 
Democracy, Murata T. in Democracy and Futures, 
Mannermaa M., Dator J. & Tiihonen P. eds., 2006. 
117 Zakaria F. The Post-American World, 2008.
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esTo advance policy design and 
implementation, it is critical to build a global 
balance between cooperation and competition, 
to strengthen multi-actor partnerships and global 
agreements based on dialogue and on shared 
values and common regulations. Likewise, it is 
essential to enable international organisations that 
equally represent all nations to be vigilant and to 
enforce widely accepted juridical approaches. 
Furthermore, there is a need for alignment of 
policies in different areas. For example, policies 
for energy, climate, food, water and transport are 
very much interdependent.
Developments such as a cultural shift from 
individual to collective values, to account for 
biodiversity or ecological flows and stocks instead 
of using GDP as a measure for policy design and 
growth, to increase governments’ transparency 
and accountability, and to empower citizens 
through new ways of learning, interacting and 
communicating, which can be supported by ICTs 
(e.g. to construct a more networked world and a 
ubiquitous healthcare), are so far not sufficiently 
well addressed in current policy and decision 
making processes.
In more concrete terms, the following three 
areas may require EU policy making to focus its 
attention:
1- Policy alignment towards sustainability
The current economic crisis has already shown 
that the paradigm in which the market will guide 
humanity in an optimal direction is failing. While 
the market may be a good means for innovation 
development, without regulation118 market forces 
may lead to further (over) exploitation of existing 
resources and an increase in the gap between 
rich and poor, with the consequences already 
described above. Moreover, the market is unable 
to fully anticipate future damage caused by climate 
change and other socio-ecological crises. The 
118 E.g. consideration of external costs, profit limit for 
companies, benefit or salary top limits.
model of unconditional economic growth must be 
reconsidered, moving towards a more sustainable 
one, taking into consideration the current limitations 
(financial and trade crises, climate change, etc.) and 
the need for urgent political decisions.
There is also the need to shift the scope of 
actions from the local to a more global scale, 
from the particular and specific to a more holistic 
approach to the complexity of situations, arising from 
interconnected challenges. Action is required on the 
local and regional levels, and this must be aligned 
with global values and agreements. Glocalisation, 
or the “think globally and act locally” approach, 
has already been proposed in the United Nations 
Conference on Environment and Development in Rio 
de Janeiro 1992 through the Agenda 21 document 
consensually approved by more than 170 nations 
that so far no national government has been able to 
fully implement through aligned policies and proper 
governance systems.
Furthermore, a harmonised approach to 
support the growth of developing economies and 
the development of the capacities needed to sustain 
themselves, as well as to welcome high-skilled 
immigration to the EU would be beneficial both for 
economic and social development, as well as for 
more intelligent global use of natural resources119.
To move in this direction, policy making may 
consider:
•	 reform	of	the	EU	agri-system	with	the	creation	
of aligned policies (e.g. transport, agriculture, 
international relations and education) to 
secure food for increasing EU demand, as well 
as to support less developed countries both to 
share the benefits of being part of a global food 
production system and to sustain themselves, 
thus ensuring the availability of natural 
resources for future generations globally.
119 This is partly reflected in the COUNCIL DIRECTIVE 
2009/50/EC of May 25 2009 on the conditions of 
entry and residence of third-country nationals for the 
purposes of highly qualified employment.
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•	 alignment	of	policies	for	energy,	climate,	food,	
water and transport to reduce EU's dependency 
on these resources by supporting the production 
of energy based on a range of renewable, 
low-carbon and high-efficiency technologies, 
as well as infrastructures which need to be 
adapted and operate in interconnected (global) 
grids whenever possible.
•	 fostering	 education	 and	 increased	 social	
awareness by aligning education and 
RTDI policies to enable the participation 
and ownership of individuals (rather than 
consumers) in decision making processes 
and to increase social understanding of 
existing technologies (e.g. GMOs, nuclear 
energy) and research into new or alternative 
solutions towards sustainability.
•	 alignment	 of	 migration,	 climate,	 external	
relations, education, RTDI, social security 
and health policies in order to manage 
migration flows related to climate change 
as well as an ageing society which urges 
the EU to support the building of global 
structures for cooperation and support for 
developing countries in tackling poverty and 
climate change, as well as in bringing these 
countries up to higher levels of development 
and education.
•	 alignment	 of	 economic,	 environmental,	
social and industrial policies to enable a 
change in the policy driver from GDP to an 
updated system considering also ecological 
flows and stocks, and regulate industry so it is 
able to establish closed-loop manufacturing 
processes as well as to foster open-source 
and user-centred innovation.
2- Social diversity and ICTs towards citizens’ 
empowerment
Policy alignment and political will are 
necessary to allow full transparency and social 
participation, and thus to change the ways in 
which individuals and businesses behave. EU 
policies could embrace the multicultural and 
social diversity of EU citizens as a competitive 
advantage, and move away from traditional 
compartmentalisation of different policy realms 
towards alignment based on dialogue and new 
ways of communicating and interacting with 
different stakeholders.
Channels to facilitate communication 
and dialogue with all citizens can be created 
by adopting a strategic agenda for developing 
democratic participation. The EU is now in 
a leading position to foster (e)participation 
and (e)democracy enabled through education 
and the way of communicating and engaging 
with different stakeholders. This requires smart 
regulations from the public sector, based on 
improved understanding and anticipation of the 
behavioural and cultural changes.
Ageing societies coupled with evolving 
migration patterns, the shift to a knowledge 
society and a possible change in the world’s 
economic and political powers present new risks 
but also offer new opportunities. A large group of 
non-ICT competent people risk being excluded 
from a knowledge-intensive environment which 
is likely to increase poverty in the EU and in the 
world in general, and widen the development 
gap between rich and developing nations. This 
shows an increasing need to invest in human and 
physical capital by enabling individuals to build 
new skills and competences, often combined with 
conventional industrially relevant knowledge. The 
destruction of old jobs and the creation of new 
ones will require capabilities to unlearn outdated 
competences and to learn new ones.
Hence, equal and affordable education for 
all is paramount, which also depends on the 
social inclusion and participation of citizens of 
every age and with different backgrounds and 
cultures, including immigrants, in the knowledge 
society. Such an education and learning 
environment would enable individual knowledge 
diversification and the building of RTDI regional 
clusters based on the necessary interdisciplinary 
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knowledge-oriented sectors. Multidisciplinarity 
and open user-centred innovation would allow 
the combination and exploitation of new and 
old technologies as well as between different 
sciences (i.e. social and life sciences), leading 
to potentially new applications and new ways of 
organising manufacturing, which could ensure 
sustained economic growth linked with the 
conservation and renewal of natural resources.
However, social understanding and 
acceptance of research and innovation linked to 
legal frameworks for technological development 
could limit controversial research (e.g. GMOs) 
and its resulting applications. In the future, 
innovations could be limited more by societal 
acceptance than by technological possibilities, 
calling for a structural debate on what is desirable 
and what is not, as well as on the values 
underlying these innovations.
At the same time new economic and political 
global powers are arising due to their increasing 
capability to re-shape manufacturing, research 
and innovation globally. The consequence is 
that the flow of financial, natural and knowledge 
resources can shift increasingly to Asia and other 
currently developing regions in the near future.
Finally, the promotion of health and well-
being, regardless of age, is a precondition for 
economic wealth and improved quality of life. 
The same is true for innovation, which needs to 
be user-centred, with research tackling societal 
challenges, as well as citizens participating in 
industry decisions from the design phase of 
products and services.
To move in this direction, EU policy making 
may consider:
•	 building	 new	 incentives	 to	 facilitate	 and	
strengthen the platform of interactions 
between different realms of social life 
including politics, institutions, civil society, 
universities, educational institutions, and 
industry in order to develop joint decisions 
and approaches to deal better with common 
challenges and opportunities.
•	 developing	 the	 necessary	 means	 to	 enhance	
education for the use of ICT in conjunction 
with different technologies supporting universal 
access to knowledge, with full information on 
government decisions, facilitating participation 
in public debates, enhancing government 
accountability, and enabling the production 
and delivery of services that hitherto were 
collectively provided.
•	 fostering	competition	within	and	between	EU	
national education systems on a global scale 
in order to improve quality and move closer 
to a learner-centred educational system, 
which is key for EU economic growth and 
social inclusion.
•	 regulation	 of	 the	 healthcare	 system	 tapping	
into new technologies to allow equal access 
to healthcare, including remote healthcare, 
and technical means of preventing disease 
and maintaining health in daily life, regardless 
of age, being this a precondition for economic 
wealth and improved quality of life.
•	 incentives	 for	 research	 focusing	 in	 the	
convergence of new (miniaturisation) 
technologies, which can lead to promising 
industrial applications and thus improved 
competitiveness in the future.
•	 development	 of	 radically	 new	 and	 far	 more	
efficient forms of social protection that combine 
protection from poverty with a high degree of 
flexibility and geographical and intersectoral 
mobility which allow people to stay longer in 
the labour market regardless of age.
3- Anticipation of future challenges to turn 
these into new opportunities
As long as it is possible to anticipate the 
causes of any economic, social or environmental 
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crisis, society is in a position to address them 
beforehand, either to deal with the likely 
consequences or even to transform them into 
opportunities. However, if the causes are not 
fully recognised, crises are inevitable. Emerging 
shortages of food, water and other resources, 
by demographic trends and human activities, 
will have far reaching economic and social 
consequences, and thus becoming multilevel 
global challenges.
Governments and companies usually react 
to changes by trying to adapt rather than being 
able to manage them properly, let alone being 
able to anticipate and welcome change. Multiple 
factors influence the ways in which the future will 
evolve and existing institutions have not yet been 
able to develop a fully systemic view of current 
and possible future situations to be prepared to 
properly shape the future. There is a latent need 
to position the EU within adaptive and dynamic 
global institutions in order to achieve global 
governance structures capable of addressing 
global and common challenges.
In this context, to consider undertaking 
foresight initiatives on global challenges at 
regular intervals is critical to build a common 
understanding of current situations and to 
translate these into common visions of the future 
of the world to be pursued jointly. To build a 
continuous and shared approach to understand 
the present, to look at different future possibilities 
and to shape a direction to follow, coupled 
with an evaluation of what has or has not been 
achieved from time to time to correct deviations 
and to continually adapt to new situations would 
help to give evidence for taking action by policy-
makers. Taking no action is a conscious decision 
and may often be the wrong one.
To move in this direction, EU policy making 
may consider:
•	 embedding	 foresight	 as	 an	 inherent	 part	
of EU aligned policy making to enable 
the continual anticipation of future 
complex situations in order to develop 
smart regulations based on the common 
understanding of the present and how the 
future can evolve, and an agreement of the 
direction to follow. EU Member States and 
regions could be encouraged to do likewise, 
as well as other parts of the world.
•	 development	 of	 the	 necessary	 means	 to	
establish global partnerships between industry-
government-society, with international 
organisations that enable the necessary 
framework conditions and juridical power 
to ensure that the above partnerships are 
developed and that industry plays its role 
within global societies.
•	 fostering	 the	 appreciation	 of	 different	 points	 of	
view both within Europe and worldwide to build 
shared values and common visions. This is key to 
start building international adaptive organisations 
and related dynamic structures, which are 
necessary to develop global agreements (i.e. set 
the right framework conditions and regulatory 
models) and joint actions.
•	 to	 this	 end,	 making	 clear	 at	 global	 fora	
what the EU stands for as an institution as 
well as who and what it represents. It could 
also consider reviewing the scale of its 
representation in international organisations 
to better balance their composition and 
effectiveness.
Finally, to enable a clearer understanding of 
the possible pathways to tackle the highlighted 
challenges in this report, scenarios could be 
developed in order to support shaping strategic 
agendas, decisions and policies, and at the same 
time to support building ownership of results so 
that these can be fully implemented. In addition, 
a periodic assessment of these scenarios would 
be necessary to update and adapt these in view 
of the latest world developments, and to support 
a trend-based, anticipatory intelligence able to 
guide sustainable development.
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